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Abstract
We study a simple model in which a monopolist supplies a multi-attribute good and
does not know whether the consumer is an expected-utility maximizer or a boundedly
rational type that follows the satisficing heuristic proposed by Herbert Simon. We find
that unless the probability of the consumer being fully rational is sufficiently high, the
fact that the boundedly rational consumer never exchanges satisfactory with unsatisfac-
tory alternatives implies that she never ends up with an alternative strictly better than
her aspiration levels.
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1. Introduction
Ellison (2006) identifies three distinct traditions in the literature on bounded ratio-
nality and industrial organization (IO). The first one is called rule-of-thumb approach.
This tradition, rather than characterizing equilibrium behavior, assumes that economic
agents behave in some simple way. The second one is called explicit bounded rational-
ity approach, assumes that cognition is costly, and derives second-best behaviors, given
the costs. The third one models economic agents as individuals subject to biases typi-
cally detected in experimental economics and psychology and examines what happens
in a market in which consumers or firms exhibit such a bias. Our paper belongs to the
third category.
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Standard models of choice assume that given a choice problem the decision-maker
chooses the alternative that yields the highest utility. Experiments have challenged this
paradigm by showing that often subjects’ behavior is consistent with simple choice
procedures (heuristics) that require less cognitive effort than standard maximization.
An example is the satisficing heuristic proposed by Herbert Simon (1955), according
to which the decision-maker has in mind an aspiration level and judges satisfactory
all those alternatives that are at least as good as the aspiration level and unsatisfactory
those that are not. The decision-maker stops searching as soon as she identifies the first
satisfactory alternative and chooses it. If there is none, she might either postpone the
decision or choose the best (or last) discovered alternative.
Imagine that a consumer, who wants to purchase a new car, is interested in only
two attributes: price and level of emissions. Assume that she prefers to spend as little
as possible and to own a car that does not pollute that much. Whether she maximizes
or follows the satisficing heuristic has an effect on her choice behavior. Consider an
alternative α = (pα, qα), where p stands for price and q for quality in terms of level of
emissions.1 If the consumer maximizes then no matter how much the price level p is
increased relative to pα within the limits imposed by the domain, one can find another
alternative β = (pβ, qβ) whose price is pβ = p that is revealed to be indifferent to α
for a sufficiently low level of emissions. On the other hand, assume that the consumer
follows the satisficing heuristic. That is, she has in mind an aspiration level for both
price and level of emissions. Assume that she judges α to be satisfactory. Note that if
the price p is increased relative to pα besides a certain level, then no matter how much
the level of emissions is reduced the consumer will never choose β = (p, qβ) over α.
The reason is that if the price p exceeds the consumer’s aspiration level on price, then
β is unsatisfactory independently of its level of emissions and therefore strictly worse
than α.
The satisficing heuristic is supported by experimental evidence. Caplin et al. (2011),
for instance, propose an experiment in which they analyze the source of choice errors
by recording intermediate choices and find that subjects behavior is consistent with
1We interpret qα < qβ if and only if α’s level of emissions is greater than β’s.
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a reservation-based model of sequential search. Reutskaja et al. (2011), on the other
hand, use eye-tracking to investigate consumer search dynamics in a context character-
ized by time pressure. They show that subjects tend to choose the optimal alternative
among those discovered and that search behavior is compatible with an hybrid of the
optimal search and the satisficing model. The satisficing heuristic has also attracted
theorists’ attention. Rubinstein and Salant (2006), for instance, propose a model in
which the decision-maker examines alternatives one by one. Caplin and Dean (2011),
on the other hand, assume that not only final but also intermediate choices are taken
into account to infer the decision-maker’s aspiration level and preferences.2
Since as highlighted above whether the decision-maker maximizes or behaves ac-
cording to the satisficing heuristic has an effect on her choice behavior, we think that
it is interesting to analyze what are the normative and behavioral implications of con-
sumers begin maximizing and satisficing in a market enivornment. We address this
research question by proposing a very simple monopolistic screening model in which
a monopolist supplies a two-attribute good and does not know whether the consumer
is an expected-utility maximizer or a satisficing type.
We find that unless the probability of the consumer being fully rational is suffi-
ciently high, the monopolist exploits the fact that the boundedly rational consumer is
unwilling to make trade-offs between satisfactory and unsatisfactory alternatives by
supplying to the satisficing type an alternative whose attributes are never better than
her aspiration levels. The fact that the boundedly rational consumer sometimes avoids
trade-offs (and the expected utility-maximizer does not) allows the monopolist to sup-
ply the ‘minimum’ to the boundedly rational consumer and, by properly combining the
attributes, an unsatisfactory alternative that yields the reservation utility to the other
type. We argue that one way to prevent this phenomenon independently of the distribu-
tion of types is to promote policies aimed at discouraging the fully rational consumer
from considering ‘extreme’ alternatives.
The literature on bounded rationality and IO has been growing over the last few
years (Ellison, 2006; Spiegler, 2011). The closest study to our work is Spiegler (2006),
2Other studies are Tyson (2008), Horan (2010), Papi (2012).
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who proposes a market model in which profit-maximizing firms compete in a multidi-
mensional pricing framework by defining boundedly rational consumers as individuals
that have limited capacity of understanding complex objects. In that model each firm
to an increase in competition responds by putting in practice a confounding strategy
rather than a strategy of more competitive prices. Unlike Spiegler (2006), we consider
a market in which only one firm is active and consumers are either satisficing or maxi-
mizing types. Studying the welfare implications of having fully and boundedly rational
agents have recently attracted attention also outside IO. For example, Abdulkadiroglu
et al. (2011) examine the welfare of naive and sophisticated players in school choice.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal model; Section
3 contains the formal analysis; Section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
2. The Model
Let X ⊆ <0+ ×<+. Each vector x = (px, qx) ∈ X represents a two-attribute alterna-
tive, where px > 0 is the price and qx ≥ 0 some attribute different from price.
On the demand side there are two types of consumer: the fully and the boundedly
rational consumer (FRC and BRC, respectively). The FRC is an expected utility max-
imizer whose Bernoulli utility function is defined as u(x) = u(g(qx) − px), where the
function g(qx) = ln(qx + 1) measures how much the FRC values characteristic qx in
monetary units. The FRC is assumed to be risk-averse and her reservation utility is
u¯ > u(0).
The BRC follows the satisficing heuristic: she judges a good y ∈ X to be satisfac-
tory whenever py ≤ p¯ and qy ≥ q¯, where p¯ > 0 and q¯ > 0 are the aspiration levels for
price and quality, respectively. Let ( p¯, q¯) ∈ X be the minimal satisfactory alternative.
The BRC’s goal is to get a satisfactory product. If the only available product is unsat-
isfactory, the BRC walks away without buying anything. If, on the other hand, more
than one satisfactory product is available, the BRC chooses the Pareto-dominant one,
if it exists. Otherwise, choice is random.
3Other studies are Pathak and Sonmez (2008) and Apesteguia and Ballester (2012).
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On the supply side, we consider the simplest setting by assuming that there is a
risk-neutral monopolist that produces good x whose profit function is pi(x) = px − αqx,
where α ∈ (0, 1). We assume that a consumer not buying anything is the worst possi-
ble scenario for the monopolist. The goal of the monopolist is to maximize expected
profits.
From now on we denote by x = (px, qx) and y = (py, qy) the products that the
monopolist supplies to the FRC and to the BRC, respectively.
3. Analysis
We first assume that the monopolist knows the consumer’s type. If the consumer
is an FRC, then the monopolist maximizes its profits subject to the reservation-utility
constraint (benchmark case).
PROBLEM 1 (benchmark case)
maxpx,qx px − αqx
s.t. (i) ln(qx + 1) − px ≥ u−1(u¯)
Let the solution be denoted by xc = (pcx, q
c
x), where c stands for certainty. Proofs
are relegated in the appendix.
Lemma 1 (Problem 1). xc = (ln( 1
α
) − u−1(u¯), 1
α
− 1) and monopolist’s profits are
pi(xc) = ln( 1
α
) − u−1(u¯) − α
(
1
α
− 1
)
.
Suppose now that the monopolist knows that consumers is a BRC. In this case the
monopolist maximizes its profits subject to the constraint that the supplied product y
has to be satisfactory, that is, py ≤ p¯ and qy ≥ q¯.
PROBLEM 2
maxpy,qy py − αqy
s.t. (i) py ≤ p¯
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(ii) qy ≥ q¯
Let the solution be denoted by yc = (pcy, q
c
y). We omit the proof as the result is
immediate.
Lemma 2 (Problem 2). yc = ( p¯, q¯) and monopolist’s profits are pi(yc) = p¯ − αq¯.
Let us now consider the interesting case in which the monopolist does not know
with certainty whether the consumer is an FRC or a BRC. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) be the proba-
bility that the consumer is an FRC. We distinguish various cases.
Case (i): u(xc) < u(yc). That is, the minimal satisfactory alternative yields more
utility than the FRC’s optimal alternative under certainty (benchmark case). If yc yields
more utility than xc, then there is no way in which the monopolist can profitably screen
the two types of consumer. The reason is that any satisfactory alternative yields more
than the reservation utility. Hence, there is no alternative z ∼ xc that the monopolist
can supply in order to induce the FRC to buy z rather than an alternative whose utility
is at least u( p¯, q¯). This implies that the monopolist supplies a product w whose utility is
strictly greater than u¯ to both types. Hence, its profits are lower than in the benchmark
case.
Case (ii): u(xc) ≥ u(yc) and xc and yc are not Pareto-ranked. In this case the mo-
nopolist is forced to screen. The reason is that, on the one hand, the minimal satisfac-
tory alternatives ( p¯, q¯) yields at most the reservation utility and, on the other hand, the
profit-maximizing product that yields the reservation utility is unsatisfactory. Hence,
the monopolist supplies xc to the FRC and yc to the BRC. Whether profits in this case
are higher than in the benchmark case depends on what are the BRC’s aspiration lev-
els. In particular, if the minimal satisfactory alternative (p¯, q¯) lies on a higher iso-profit
curve than pi(xc), then profits are higher for any probability ρ ∈ (0, 1). On the other
hand, if the minimal satisfactory alternative is relatively extreme relative to xc, then it
might happen that pi(yc) < pi(xc) and, therefore, monopolist’s profits are lower than in
the benchmark case.
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Case (iii): xc Pareto-dominates yc. That is, p¯ > pcx and that q¯ < q
c
x, so that both
xc and yc are satisfactory, u(xc) > u(yc), and unsatisfactory alternatives are relatively
‘extreme’ from the FRC’s point of view. This case is depicted in figure 1.
-
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Figure 1: The fact that the BRC does not exchange satisfactory with unsatisfactory alternatives might prevent
her from getting something more than ( p¯, q¯)
If the monopolist does not screen, then it is forced to supply xc to both types. The
reason is two-fold. First, the monopolist wants to supply an alternative that yields at
least the reservation utility to the FRC. Second, if there is more than one satisfactory
alternative available, the BRC buys the Pareto-dominant one. Hence, if the monopolist
does not screen, then its profits are those of the benchmark case. That is, pi(xc) =
ln
(
1
α
)
− u−1(u¯) − α
(
1
α
− 1
)
.
It remains to figure out what are the monopolist’s profits under the assumption that
the monopolist screens.
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PROBLEM 3
maxpx,py,qx,qy ρ (px − αqx) + (1 − ρ)
(
py − αqy
)
s.t. (i) ln(qx + 1) − px ≥ u−1(u¯)
(ii) py ≤ p¯
(iii) qy ≥ q¯
(iv) ln(qx + 1) − px ≥ ln(qy + 1) − py
(v) px ≥ p¯ or qx ≤ q¯
Problem 3 says that the monopolist has to find two goods x, y ∈ X such that ex-
pected profits are maximized, where x yields the reservation utility and y is satisfactory.
However, the optimal solution must satisfy also the incentive-compatible constraints.
That is, first, alternative x must yield at least the same level of utility of good y. Second,
good x does not have to be more than satisfactory. That is, either px ≥ p¯ or qx ≤ q¯.
We denote the solution of problem 3 by xu and yu.
Lemma 3 (Problem 3). Assume that xc Pareto-dominates yc.
1. If constraint (v) is px ≥ p¯, then xu = ( p¯, e p¯+u−1(u¯) − 1), yu = ( p¯, q¯), and monopo-
list’s profits are piu = ρ
[
p¯ − α
(
ep¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1
)]
+ (1 − ρ)pi(yc).
2. If constraint (v) is qx ≤ q¯, then xu = (ln (q¯ + 1) − u−1(u¯), q¯), yu = ( p¯, q¯), and
monopolist’s profits are piu = ρ
[
ln (q¯ + 1) − u−1(u¯) − αq¯
]
+ (1 − ρ)pi(yc).
The solutions to problem 3 are depicted in figure 1. Assume without loss of general-
ity that imposing constraint px ≥ p¯ is more profitable than imposing qx ≤ q¯. Then, mo-
nopolist’s profits are piu = ρpi(xu)+ (1−ρ)pi(yc) = ρ
[
p¯ − α
(
e p¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1
)]
+ (1−ρ)pi(yc).
The monopolist will screen if and only if ρpi(xu) + (1 − ρ)pi(yc) > pi(xc) or, equiv-
alently, ρ < ρˆ ≡ p¯−(ln( 1α )−u−1(u¯))+α[( 1α−1)−q¯]
α
[(
e p¯+u−1(u¯)−1
)
−q¯
] .4 That is, the monopolist will screen if
4Note that ρˆ ∈ (0, 1). The fact that ρˆ > 0 follows from the assumption that xc Pareto-dominates yc.
Next, assume, by contradiction, that ρˆ > 1. Then, p¯ − α
(
ep¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1
)
> ln
(
1
α
)
− u−1(u¯) − α
(
1
α − 1
)
. Or,
equivalently, pi(xu) > pi(xc). Since both xc and xu lie on the indifference curve that yields u¯, pi(xu) > pi(xc)
contradicts lemma 1 and the fact that xc is a profit-maximizing product that yields the reservation utility.
Finally, ρˆ = 1 if and only if p¯ = pcx, which is ruled out by assumption.
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and only if the probability that the consumer is a BRC is sufficiently high. Since
pi(yc) > pi(xc) > pi(xu), then a sufficiently high probability that the consumer is a BRC
puts more weight on pi(yc) relative to pi(xu) and therefore makes the screening more
profitable.
The next proposition summarizes the observations we have made so far.
Proposition 1 (Welfare).
• The FRC always enjoys at least the reservation utility u¯. If u(yc) > u(xc), she
enjoys more than u¯.
• The BRC buys an alternative strictly better than ( p¯, q¯) if and only if ρ > ρˆ and xc
Pareto-dominates yc. Otherwise, she gets ( p¯, q¯).
Proposition 1 suggests that the FRC clearly benefits from uncertainty. On the other
hand, the BRC benefits too, but to a much smaller extent, in the sense that in order
for the BRC to get something more than the minimal satisfactory alternative ( p¯, q¯) not
only the probability ρ that the consumer is an FRC has to be sufficiently high, but also
the FRC’s optimal alternative under certainty (benchmark case) has to Pareto-dominate
( p¯, q¯). This suggests also that, unlike what one might think, greater rationality on the
demand side of the market (i.e., an higher ρ) does not necessarily imply an increase in
the consumer’s welfare.
4. Discussion and Conclusions
The intuition behind the result of proposition 1 is that the BRC follows a non-
compensatory decision strategy, where by noncompensatory we mean a decision strat-
egy according to which the decision-maker avoids trade-offs between attributes (Payne
et al., 1993). Indeed, a decision-maker whose behavior is consistent with the satisficing
heuristic never exchanges satisfactory with unsatisfactory alternatives.
For an illustration consider again figure 1. In that scenario one expects that un-
der uncertainty the monopolist makes the BRC better off by supplying to both types a
good that yields at least the reservation utility u¯. However, if the probability that the
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consumer is an FRC is sufficiently low, then, on the contrary, the monopolist screens
the two types of consumer by pushing x outside the satisfactory area (towards either
north-east or south-west) along the indifference curve that yields u¯ until it reaches its
border. In this way xu is unsatisfactory and yields the reservation utility and the mo-
nopolist is free to supply the minimal satisfactory alternative to the BRC.5 Notice that
the monopolist can adopt this strategy precisely because, on the one hand, the FRC is
perfectly able to make trade-offs between attributes, and, on the other hand, the BRC
never exchanges satisfactory with unsatisfactory alternatives.
One way of improving BRC’s welfare in the case depicted in figure 1 indepen-
dently of the probability ρ is to implement policies aimed at making unsatisfactory
alternatives unattractive to the FRC. This would diminish the probability that the FRC
considers ‘extreme’ alternatives and, in turn, reduce the monopolist’s production space
to satisfactory alternatives only. In this case the monopolist would be forced to sup-
ply to both types an alternative that yields the reservation utility independently of ρ,
making the BRC better off.
Our work can be extended in various ways. First, in the present work we restrict our
attention to a limited class of cases (e.g. one specified utility function, two attributes,
one good). A natural extension is to perform the above analysis by considering a more
general framework. Second, in the proposed model we assume that the monopolist
knows the BRC’s aspiration levels. An interesting extension would be to investigate
whether the results of proposition 1 are robust to the relaxation of this assumption. We
leave this for future research.
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AppendixA. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Problem 1 can be rewritten as follows.
maxpx,qx px − αqx
s.t. (i) px − ln(qx + 1) ≤ −u−1(u¯)
Here are the Lagrangian and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
L(px, qx, λ) = px − αqx − λ(px − ln(qx + 1) + u−1(u¯))
∂L
∂px
= 1 − λ = 0 (A.1)
∂L
∂qx
= −α + λ
qx + 1
≤ 0 (A.2)
∂L
∂λ
= ln(qx + 1) − px − u−1(u¯) ≥ 0 (A.3)
together with px > 0, qx, λ ≥ 0, qx
(
∂L
∂qx
)
= 0, and λ
(
∂L
∂λ
)
= 0.
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By condition A.1, λ∗ = 1. Therefore, constraint (i) must be binding. Next, suppose,
by contradiction, that qx = 0. This implies that px = −u−1(u¯) < 0, which leads to a
contradiction. Therefore, qx > 0 and condition A.2 must be binding. Plugging λ∗ = 1
into condition A.2 and solving for qx, we get q∗x =
1
α
− 1. Next, plugging q∗x into
condition A.3 and solving for px, we get p∗x = ln(
1
α
) − u−1(u¯). Let this solution be
denoted by xc.
Proof of Lemma 3. We prove the statement in the case in which constraint (v) is
p¯ ≤ px. The case in which constraint (v) is instead q ≤ q¯ is analogous and, therefore,
omitted. We rewrite below problem 3.
maxpx,py,qx,qy ρ (px − αqx) + (1 − ρ)
(
py − αqy
)
s.t. (i) px − ln(q1 + 1) ≤ −u−1(u¯)
(ii) py − p¯ ≤ 0
(iii) q¯ − qy ≤ 0
(iv) px − ln(qx + 1) − py + ln(qy + 1) ≤ 0
(v) p¯ − px ≤ 0
Here are the Lagrangian and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
L(px, py, qx, qy, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5, λ6) = ρ (px − αqx) + (1 − ρ)
(
py − αqy
)
− λ1(px −
ln(qx+1)+u−1(u¯))−λ2(py− p¯)−λ3(q¯−qy)−λ4(px−ln(qx+1)−py+ln(qy+1))−λ5(q¯−px)
∂L
∂px
= ρ − λ1 − λ4 + λ5 = 0 (A.4)
∂L
∂py
= (1 − ρ) − λ2 + λ4 = 0 (A.5)
∂L
∂qx
= −ρα + λ1
qx + 1
+
λ4
qx + 1
≤ 0 (A.6)
∂L
∂qy
= −(1 − ρ)α + λ3 − λ4qy + 1 ≤ 0 (A.7)
∂L
∂λ1
= ln(qx + 1) − px − u−1(u¯) ≥ 0 (A.8)
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∂L
∂λ2
= p¯ − py ≥ 0 (A.9)
∂L
∂λ3
= qy − q¯ ≥ 0 (A.10)
∂L
∂λ4
= ln(qx + 1) − px − ln(qy + 1) + py ≥ 0 (A.11)
∂L
∂λ5
= px − p¯ ≥ 0 (A.12)
together with px, py > 0, qx, qy, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, λ5 ≥ 0, qx
(
∂L
∂qx
)
= 0, qy
(
∂L
∂qy
)
= 0,
λ1
(
∂L
∂λ1
)
= 0, λ2
(
∂L
∂λ2
)
= 0, λ3
(
∂L
∂λ3
)
= 0, λ4
(
∂L
∂λ4
)
= 0, and λ5
(
∂L
∂λ5
)
= 0.
Notice that since q¯ > 0, then, by condition A.10, qy > 0, and, therefore, condition
A.7 must be binding. Therefore, it must be that λ3 > 0. This implies that q∗y = q¯. Next,
condition A.5 implies that λ2 > 0. Hence, py = p¯. Further, assume by contradiction
that qx = 0. Then, by condition A.8, px ≤ −u−1(u¯). Since u−1(u¯) > 0, then px < 0,
which leads to a contradiction. Therefore, qx > 0 and condition A.6 must be binding.
Finally, notice that it cannot be that λ1 = λ4 = 0, because otherwise, by condition A.4,
λ5 = −ρ, which leads to a contradiction.
• Assume first that λ5 = 0. This implies that px > p¯.
– Suppose that λ1, λ4 > 0. Hence, constraints (i) and (iv) must be binding.
Moreover, by condition A.4, λ1 +λ4 = 1. Using this result in condition A.6
and solving for qx, we get q∗x =
1
α
−1. Next, plugging q∗x into condition A.8
and solving for px, we get p∗x = ln
(
1
α
)
− u−1(u¯). However, this contradicts
the fact that xc Pareto-dominates yc.
– Assume λ1 > 0 and λ4 = 0. This implies that constraint (i) must be binding
and constraint (iv) holds with strict inequality. Moreover, by condition
A.4, λ1 = ρ. Using this result in condition A.6 and solving for qx, we get
q∗x =
1
α
− 1. Next, plugging q∗x into condition A.8 and solving for px, we
get p∗x = ln
(
1
α
)
− u−1(u¯). However, again this contradicts the fact that xc
Pareto-dominates yc.
– Assume that λ1 = 0 and λ4 > 0. This implies that constraint (i) holds
with strict inequality and constraint (iv) must be binding. Moreover, by
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condition A.4, λ4 = ρ. Using this result in condition A.6 and solving for
qx, we get q∗x =
1
α
− 1. Next, plugging q∗x into condition A.11 and solving
for px, we get p∗x = ln
(
1
α
)
− ln(q¯ + 1) + p¯. Again, a contradiction.
• Suppose that λ5 > 0. This implies that p∗x = p¯.
– Suppose that λ1, λ4 > 0. This implies that constraints (i) and (iv) must
be binding. Plugging p∗x into condition A.8 and solving for qx, we get
q∗x = e p¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1. Next, by condition A.11, p¯ + u−1(u¯) − p¯ = ln(q¯ + 1) − p¯,
which implies that u¯ = u( p¯, q¯). However, this contradicts the fact that xc
Pareto-dominates yc.
– Suppose that λ1 > 0 and λ4 = 0. This implies that constraint (i) must
be binding and constraint (iv) holds with strict inequality. Plugging p∗x
into condition A.8 and solving for qx, we get q∗x = ep¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1. Next, by
condition A.11 p¯+u−1(u¯)− p¯ > ln(q¯+1)− p¯, which implies that u¯ > u( p¯, q¯).
– Suppose that λ1 = 0 and λ4 > 0. This implies that constraint (i) holds
with strict inequality and constraint (iv) must be binding. Plugging p∗x into
condition A.11 and solving for qx, we get q∗x = q¯. Next, by condition A.8
ln(q¯ + 1) − p¯ − u−1(u¯) > 0, which implies that u¯ < u( p¯, q¯). Again this
contradicts the fact that xc Pareto-dominates yc.
The only case in which a contradiction does not take place is when p∗x = p¯, q∗x =
ep¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1. Note that in this case monopolist’s profits are ρ
[
p¯ − α
(
ep¯+u
−1(u¯) − 1
)]
+
(1 − ρ)pi(yc). This concludes the proof.
15
> A monopolist  supplies  a  multi-attribute  good.  > The monopolist  does  not  know whether  the 
consumer is a maximizing or satisficing type. > The satisficing type almost never benefits from 
uncertainty.
